Opacity is a confidentiality property that characterizes the non-disclosure of specified secret information of a system to an outside observer. In this paper, we consider the enforcement of opacity within the discrete-event system formalism in the presence of multiple intruders. We study two cases, one without coordination among the intruders and the other with coordination. We propose appropriate notions of opacity corresponding to the two cases, respectively, and propose enforcement mechanisms based on the implementation of insertion functions, which manipulates the output of the system by inserting fictitious observable events whenever necessary. The effectiveness of the proposed opacity-enforcement approaches is validated through illustrative examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security and privacy have become important issues in the design of cyber and cyber-physical systems [1] . Among the security and privacy properties studied in the literature, we are interested in opacity [2] , which is a property that justifies whether a given system's confidential information (denoted as "secret") is kept uncertain from an external observer (termed as an intruder). In this paper, we consider opacity issues in the framework of discrete-event systems (DES) [3] . An opacity problem is generally formulated as follows [4] : (i) the system is modeled as a Petri net [5] or a finite automaton [6] ; (ii) the system possesses a secret; (iii) the intruder is an observer with full knowledge of the system's model but can only observe its behavior partially. The system is said to be opaque with respect to the given secret if for any behavior generated by the system that may reveal the secret (termed secret behavior), there exists at least one behavior that does not reveal the secret (termed non-secret behavior) and shares the same observation of the secret behavior to the intruder; thus, the intruder can never be sure if the secret has occurred. Depending on how the secret is defined, a considerable amount of research efforts has been devoted to the formal verification of various opacity notions of DES, see, e.g. [7] - [10] and the references therein.
Besides the verification of opacity properties, supervisory controllers were designed to ensure opacity in the literature [11] , [12] . The supervisory control approach is not suitable for situations where the system must execute its full behavior. A runtime mechanism was developed in [13] to enforce Kstep opacity based on delaying the output which ensured opacity whose time duration was of concern. A dynamic The partial support of the National Science Foundation (Grant No. CNS-1446288, ECCS-1253488, IIS-1724070) and of the Army Research Laboratory (Grant No. W911NF-17-1-0072) is gratefully acknowledged.
The authors are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, 46556 USA. bwu3@nd.edu, jdai1@nd.edu, hlin1@nd.edu observer was proposed in [14] to ensure opacity by manipulating the system's output. However, the intermittent loss of observability of certain events may remind the intruder of the existence of the opacity-enforcement mechanism. Wu and Lafortune [15] proposed an enforcement mechanism based on insertion of fictitious observable events at the system's output; the inserted events were observationally equivalent to the system's genuine observable events from the intruder's perspective, therefore confusing the intruder. Less effort however has been made to solve the opacity problems in the presence of multiple intruders. Badouel et al. [16] considered multiple intruders with independent secrets. The system therein was said to be concurrently opaque if all secrets can be kept safe. The notion of "joint opacity" was proposed in [6] , in which a team of intruders collaborated through a coordinator to infer the secret of common interest. Decentralized opacity with and without coordination among the intruders was studies in [17] . Nevertheless, to the best of the authors' knowledge, most of the existing results are established on opacity verification problems but very limited work has been proposed to enforce these decentralized/concurrent opacity notions. In this paper, by modeling a DES that can be observed by multiple intruders as a finite automaton, we consider opacity-enforcement problems in the presence of either non-coordinated or coordinated intruders. We adopt the enforcement mechanism based on insertion functions to assure decentralized opacity when no coordination exists among the intruders, whereas a centralized coordination and refinement approach is added to the local insertion functions so that joint opacity can be enforced when intruders coordinate via an intersection-based protocol. Due to the space limitation, we omit the proofs to the theorems which can be found in [18] .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present the system model and concepts related to opacityenforcement of DES in Section II. The opacity-enforcement problem for multiple non-coordinated intruders is studied in Section III. Under the assumption that the intruders may coordinate via an intersection-based protocol, we introduce the notion of joint opacity in Section IV and develop enforcement schemes by incorporating the synthesis of local insertion functions with centralized coordination. Section V concludes the paper with the discussion of future work.
II. OPACITY OF DISCRETE-EVENT SYSTEMS A. Preliminaries of Discrete-event Systems
For a finite set E of events, let |E| and 2 E denote the cardinality and power set of E, respectively. E * stands for the set of all finite strings over E plus the empty string . A subset of L ⊆ E * is called a language over E. The prefix closure of L is defined by
We consider the DES modeled as a non-deterministic finite automaton (NFA) G = (X, E, f, X 0 ), where X is the finite set of states, E is the finite set of events, f : X ×E → 2 X is the (partial) transition function, X 0 ⊆ X is the set of initial states. The transition function f can be extended to X × E * in the natural way [3] .Given a set X ⊆ X of states, the language generated by G from X is defined by
The generated behavior of G is then given by L(G, X 0 ). We write L(G) if X 0 is clear from the context.
In general, the system G can only be partially observed and E is partitioned into the set of observable and unobservable events, i.e., E = E o∪ E uo . The presence of partial observation is captured by the natural projection P :
for any s ∈ E * and e ∈ E. The inverse projection of P is defined as
B. Current-state Opacity of Discrete-event Systems
In this paper, we define the secret to be a subset of states of G and consider the notion of current-state opacity (CSO). Intuitively, the system G is CSO if for any secret behavior that visits a secret state, there always exists a non-secret behavior of G that visits a non-secret state while the intruder cannot distinguish between these two behaviors. Formally, current-state opacity is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (CSO): Given the set of observable events E o ⊆ E, the set of secret states X S ⊆ X and the set of non-secret states X N S ⊆ X, CSO holds with respect to E o and X S if
According to [6] , the notions of language-based opacity, initial-state opacity and initial-and-final-state opacity can all be transformed to CSO in polynomial time. Thus, our proposed enforcement approach for CSO of DES has the potential to the enforcement of other opacity notions as well. We assume without loss of generality in the rest of this paper that the set of non-secret states is the complement of the secret state set, i.e., X N S = X\X S .
C. Event Insertion Mechanism
A CSO-enforcement mechanism was proposed in [15] by using insertion functions. An insertion function receives an output behavior in s ∈ P [L(G)] and inserts fictitious observable events whenever the intruder may infer the occurrence of the secret from s. We associate each inserted event with an "insertion label" I, and the set of inserted events is denoted by E I = {e I : e ∈ E o }. It is worth pointing out that the intruder cannot distinguish inserted observable events from the system's genuine observable events.
Formally, an insertion function is defined as a (possibly partial) mapping f I :
that outputs a string with inserted events based on the system's historical and current output behavior. Given a string se o ∈ P [L(G)] the insertion function outputs f I (s, e o ) = s I e o before the occurrence of e o , where s I ∈ E * I . In the sequel, we assume that length of s I is bounded from above. We define an induced insertion function f str I for strings from f I : f str I ( ) = and f str I (s n ) = f I ( , e 1 )f I (e 1 , e 2 ) · · · f I (e 1 e 2 e n−1 , e n ) where s n = e 1 e 2 · · · e n ∈ E * o . The modified output L out of the system G in the presence of the insertion function f str I is then given by
We use f I and f str I interchangeably in the sequel for brevity. In this paper, we are looking for the insertion functions that satisfy the private enforceability [19] .
Definition 2 (Private Enforceability): Given a DES G and the observation mask P , an insertion function
Intuitively, the admissibility requires that the insertion function f I is well defined on all the strings from P [L(G)]. The private safety requirement restricts the modified output L out from f I to the non-secret behavior of the system L saf e , which is the set of projected strings that never reveal the secret. Therefore, by the definition, a private enforcing insertion function guarantees CSO.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF DECENTRALIZED OPACITY
In this section, we consider opacity-enforcement of DES that can be observed by multiple non-coordinated intruders. The decentralized observation architecture of the DES G is shown in Fig. 1 . Let I i , i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , N } denote a team of N intruders. Similar to the centralized scenario, each intruder has a complete prior knowledge of the system G. Intruder I i is associated with the locally observable events E o,i ⊆ E, i ∈ N . The partial observation for I i is characterized by the projection P i : E * → E * o,i when no insertion function exists. The property of decentralized current-state opacity (D-CSO) is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3 (D-CSO): Given the set of observable events E o,i ⊆ E for intruder I i , i ∈ N and the secret state set X S , the system G = (X, E, f, X 0 ) is said to be decentralized current-state opaque with respect to E o,i i ∈ N and X S if
It follows from Definition 3 that D-CSO can be viewed as a decentralized counterpart of CSO, which implies that enforcing D-CSO for G with multiple intruders is equivalent to enforcing CSO with respect to each individual intruder I i , i ∈ N . Motivated by this fact, we can synthesize local opacity-enforcing insertion function f i for I i , i ∈ N independently. Note that each intruder may only observe the output of the corresponding insertion functions.
We illustrate the synthesis of insertion functions for each intruder by the following example.
Example 1:
We assume that G is observed by two intruders I 1 and I 2 with E o,1 = {b, c, d} and E o,2 = {a, c, d}, respectively. The observers obs 1 and obs 2 can be constructed in a standard way [3] and are shown in Fig. 3 . Each state in obs i contains the current state estimation of intruder I i , i = 1, 2. From Fig. 3 , both observers will reveal some secrets (the shaded states in Fig. 3 ). Since there is no coordination between the intruders, we follow the procedures in [20] to construct the all insertion structure (AIS) that encodes all the valid system and insertion function moves for each intruder respectively. It is then possible to extract an insertion function from the AIS.
The AIS (Q, E o ∪ { }, f, q 0 ) can be seen as a game structure between the system and the insertion function, where Q = Q S ∪ Q I , Q S denotes the system state set and Q I denotes the insertion function state set. Each q ∈ Q S has a pair of state estimates, the first one is the intruder's estimate, which could be wrong due to the inserted events, and the second estimate is the real system estimate. For each q ∈ Q I , besides the intruder and system's state estimate, it also consists of current system output from G. f (q, e) = q for q, q ∈ Q and e ∈ E o ∪ { } represents the transition function, q 0 ∈ Q S is the initial state. As shown in Fig. 4 , the rectangles represent the system states and the ellipses represent the insertion function states. All the transitions with events originated from the system states are system moves that are not controllable, while all the transitions with events from insertion function states are insertion function moves that the intruder actually observes. Theorem 1: [15] CSO is privately enforceable if and only if the AIS is nonempty.
Remark 1: The main differences of our paper's AIS definition from [20] are two folds. The first is that we unfold the moves of the insertion function as well as the intruder's state estimate event by event, while in [20] , the insertion function's move is from E * o ∪ { }, which could denote the whole string that has been inserted. For example, in our AIS definition, if we have a transition q 0 [20] 's definition, the same transition would be simplified to q 0 abc − − → q 3 . The second is that, if the system G contains loops (for the simplest case, imagine there is a self-loop in some state), it could be the case that the inserted string contains s * for some s ∈ E * o and becomes arbitrarily long (for example, Fig. 7 in [20] ). In our paper, we restrict the inserted strings to be * -free, that is, the insertions cannot be arbitrarily long and we replace s * with . Our definition with unfolding and * -free in insertions are realistic and can facilitate the analysis of joint opacity enforcement in Section IV. AIS 2 is similar to AIS 1 so we don't show it due to the space limitation but can be found in [18] . For instance, in AIS 1 , starting from the initial state where the intruder and the system's estimates are (m 0 , m 0 ). If the event b occurs in the system, AIS 1 transits to the insertion function state ((m 0 , m 1 ), a) since the system observer sees the event b and the intruder observer observes nothing as the insertion has not been decided yet. Then if the insertion function decides to insert c, the system transits to the insertion function state ((m 2 , m 1 ), c) as the intruder observer observes c and the system observer will ignore the insertion function outputs. Then the real system output b is appended and consequently the AIS transits to the system state (m 3 , m 1 ).
Theorem 2: Given the system G and N intruders with observation mask P i , i ∈ N , D-CSO is privately enforceable if and only if AIS i is nonempty for all i ∈ N .
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF JOINT OPACITY
Rather than observing the same system without coordination, in many applications, intruders do coordinate among themselves by exchanging their estimates of the system's states. For these applications, decentralized opacity notions of coordinated intruders need further investigation.
A. Intersection-based Coordination Protocol
In this section, we investigate intruders that may coordinate with each other via an intersection-based protocol [17] . We assume that the team of intruders I i , i ∈ N not only generate local state estimates but report the estimates to a coordinator as well. The coordinator has no knowledge about the system. It forms the so-called coordinated estimate by taking the intersection of the local estimates it receives. The communication from the local intruders to the coordinator is assumed to have no delay. The collaboration is restricted by the following rules: (i) intruders have no knowledge of the projections of one another; (ii) the only collaboration between the intruders is through the coordinator.
Before proceeding to opacity issues in the coordinated decentralized framework, we first study the intersectionbased coordination protocol. For the intruder I i , i ∈ N , a string-based local estimation map ψ i : P i [L(G)] → 2 X is defined as follows: for s ∈ L(G) and s i := P i (s), ψ i (s i ) = f x 0 , P −1 i (s i ) ∩ L(G) . Then, we define an intersection-based coordination protocol Ψ :
Intuitively, the coordination protocol Ψ takes the intersection of the local estimates reported by the intruders and forms a coordinated estimate accordingly.
B. Enforcement Scheme of Joint Opacity Property
We now consider opacity issues of DES that can be observed by intruders coordinating via the intersection-based coordination protocol in Eq. 1. Roughly speaking, the system is said to be jointly current-state opaque (J-CSO) if no coordinated estimate ever reveals the secret information.
Definition 4 (J-CSO): Given the set of observable events E o,i ⊆ E for intruder I i , i ∈ N , the secret state set X S and the intersection-based coordination protocol Ψ, the system G = (X, E, f, X 0 ) is said to be J-CSO with respect to E o,i , i ∈ N and X S if for each intruder: (i) local CSO holds; (ii) Ψ(s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s N ) ∩ X S = ∅; (iii) Ψ(s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s N ) ∩ (X\X S ) = ∅.
In this paper, we present a centralized approach to synthesize the individual insertion functions to enforce J-CSO. The following example shows that, in general, local insertion functions that enforce D-CSO of a system may not enforce J-CSO.
Example 2: With AIS 1 in Fig. 4 and AIS 2 which can be found in [18] , D-CSO is guaranteed in Example 1. However, if the two intruders can send their estimates to the intersection-based coordinator, joint opacity may be violated. For instance, from Fig. 3 , if the string cab happens in the system, it will be projected to be cb and ca for intruders 1 and 2, respectively. If both insertion functions choose not to insert anything, which are valid moves from their local AISs, the resulting estimates reported by intruders 1 and 2, after observing cb and ca, are {5, 6} and {4, 6} from Fig. 3 . As our coordinator performs the intersection of the estimation, it will result in {6} ∈ X S , which reveals a secret.
Example 2 implies that insertion functions that enforce D-CSO do not necessarily guarantee J-CSO. Therefore, the insertion functions need to be specifically coordinated to enforce the J-CSO.
Our first step is to encode the AIS into a corresponding Nondeterministic Finite State Mealy machine (NFM) for a concise representation.
Definition 5: An NFM M = (Q, Σ In , Σ Out , q 0 , f N M F ) is a 5-tuple, where Q is the set of states, Σ In and Σ Out are the sets of input and output symbols, respectively, q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state, f N M F (q, e) = (q , o) defines the transition and input output relation for q, q ∈ Q, e ∈ Σ In , o ∈ Σ Out .
The nondeterminism of an NFM comes from the fact that in general |f N M F (q, e)| ≥ 1, which implies that the same input on the same state may result in transitions to different states. Our NFM formulation is similar to the insertion automaton [20] but we allow nondeterministic choices of insertions upon observing a system output e ∈ E o . The procedure to convert an AIS into an NFM M = (Q, Σ In , Σ Out , q 0 , f ) is as follows. Q is the set of all the systems states of AIS. Σ In is the set of all the events from system states and Σ Out is the set of all the possible insertion strings. The transition function is defined as f (q, e) = (q , o), where o = o + e, o ∈ E * I , e ∈ E o , o is the inserted string, e is the system input and o denotes the output from the state q when the system input is e.
Example 3: Fig. 5 denotes the NFM 1 corresponding to AIS 1 in Fig. 4 . Due to the space limitation, we don't show NFM 2 which can be found in [18] . Note that, different from AIS, in the NFM formulation, upon observing an event e, the state directly jumps from q to q while outputting the string o. However, what really happens, as shown in AIS, is that the intruder's estimation is updated event by event for each output of the insertion function. Such estimation evolution is omitted in the NFM formulation for conciseness but can be recovered from our AIS.
To keep the NFMs synchronized with the original system that intruders try to compromise, we construct another system observer obs as a DFA with E obs,o = i∈N E o,i . That is, if an event is observable to any one of the in- truders, it is observable to this system observer. In our example, E obs,o = E and the observer has the identical structure with the original system as shown in Fig. 2 .
The observer obs can be viewed as an NFM that outputs empty string for all inputs. Given N AISs' in the form of NFM M i = (Q i , Σ i In , Σ i Out , q i 0 , f i ) for i ∈ N and the system observer obs, we can obtain the composed NFM G = (Q G , Σ In , Σ Out , q 0 , f ) that describes all the possible combined insertion behaviors, where
While constructing this product NFM G, we assume that when an event e ∈ Σ o in the system occurs, it is guaranteed that for every intruder I i such that e ∈ E o,i holds, its corresponding insertion function will finish outputting the modified string o i before the next system event e ∈ E o is generated. It is always possible since we restrict the output of the insertion functions to be * -free. In this regard, every insertion function is synchronized with the system inputs. For a given transition f ((q 0 , q 1 , ..., q n−1 , q obs ), e) = ((q 0 , q 1 , ..., q n−1 , q obs ), o), it is then possible to check whether the secrets will be revealed and joint opacity could be violated during this transition with the help of the AISs, since as mentioned earlier, the event by event evolution of the state estimation for each intruder upon observing a modified string is omitted in the NFM but not AIS.
For example, in the NFM from Fig. 6 , starting from the initial state, when the event c happens and the insertion functions decide to insert d and respectively, the transition is (m 0 , c 0 , 0) Note that there is an intermediate state (m 4 , c 2 , 3) that is not shown in G. In the first step, upon observing the system event c, the first insertion function outputs d and the second insertion function, since it decides to insert nothing, the system event c is directly outputted. Therefore, the estimations evolve from m 0 to m 4 , c 0 to c 2 , and the system observer's estimation changes from 0 to 3. In the second step, the first insertion function outputs the system event c and the second insertion function outputs . It can be seen that our assumption is that the event output (including ) for each intruder is synchronized.
To determine if a transition (q, e) → (q , o) in G is safe, we examine every intermediate state from the AISs that evolves with each output event to see if the joint estimation reveals a secret. By definition, q obs encodes the true set of states that the system is currently in. The first element of AIS i statewe denote as est i -represents each intruder's estimation of the current state. According to our coordination rule, the joint estimation J est is then obtained by taking intersection among q obs and est i , i ∈ N , i.e., J est = q obs ∩ est 0 ∩ . . . ∩ est n−1 .
Proposition 1:
We now define J-CSO as follows. Definition 6: Given N intruders with unobservable event sets E uo,1 , E uo,2 , ..., E uo,N and their insertion functions f I,1 , f I,2 , ..., f I,N , the system is J-CSO against the intruders if for each individual intruder i, the insertion function f I,i enforces local CSO and the J est never reveals the secret.
Furthermore, we define J-CSO to be jointly privately enforceable if all individual insertion functions are locally privately enforcing and J est never reveals the secret.
An intermediate state is unsafe if its J est reveals a secret. A transition (q, e) → (q , o) in G is unsafe if any of the intermediate states between q and q is unsafe. Similarly, any state q ∈ Q of G is unsafe if its J est reveals a secret. If a transition is found to be unsafe, it will be pruned. If a state q ∈ Q is found to be unsafe, this state, together with all its incoming and outgoing transitions, will be pruned. If after the pruning, at some state q ∈ Q, there is no incoming transition (except the initial state) or there is no outgoing transition defined on an event e that could happen in this state, which implies that the system blocks when e happens at q since there is no insertion function available, then such state is also unsafe and all its incoming and outgoing transitions will be pruned. Again, such pruning may trigger new deadlocks and create unsafe states. Therefore, this is an iterative process until no unsafe state is found or the initial state is pruned. If G is not empty after pruning, then we can extract the individual insertion functions from it.
For example, as shown in Fig. 6 , the state (m 3 , c 3 , 6) is an unsafe state that reveals the secret. Because m 3 ∩ c 3 ∩ {6} = {5, 6} ∩ {4, 6} ∩ {6} = {6} ∈ X S . Therefore, it has to be pruned, which results in the states (m 2 , c 3 , 4) and (m 3 , c 2 , 5) being unsafe since there are no outgoing transitions any more. Consequently, pruning (m 2 , c 3 , 4) and (m 3 , c 2 , 5) makes (m 2 , c 2 , 3) unsafe. After deleting (m 2 , c 2 , 3), the pruning process stops. Since no more state or transitions is found to be unsafe, the resulting G can be found in Fig. 6 , excluding the states in the dashed box.
Theorem 3: Given the system model G and N intruders I i , i ∈ N , J-CSO is jointly privately enforceable if and only 
C. Complexity Analysis
In the presence of N intruders and the system G with |X| states, the space and time complexities to construct each AIS are both polynomial with |X E | [20] , where |X E | = 2 |X| denotes the number of states of the state estimator. Note that the size of each NFM's state space is at most the size of its corresponding AIS. Therefore, the space complexity to construct G is polynomial in |X E | and exponential in |N |. The pruning process, in the worst case, looks over all the states in G and intermediate states, which is also polynomial in |X E | and exponential in |N |. To sum up, the space and time complexities in our proposed synthesis approach are both polynomial with |X E | and exponential in |N |.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigate the opacity-enforcement problem for discrete-event systems in the presence of multiple intruders. We introduce opacity notions corresponding to non-coordinated and coordinated intruders, respectively. The event insertion mechanism is adopted to ensure decentralized opacity for intruders without coordination; whereas the synthesized insertion functions are further refined to enforce joint opacity when intruders coordinate via an intersectionbased protocol. Future work may focus on development of opacity-enforcing algorithms for joint opacity with respect to other types of coordination protocols.
